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Abstract 
We estimate real wage cyclicality in the period between 1987 and 2013 using a large 
administrative dataset of workers in Spain. Real wages are weakly procyclical in Spain and, 
focusing on different phases of the business cycle, we find significant differences between 
expansions and recessions, with even lower real wage cyclicality in recessions. Furthermore, 
higher levels of unemployment do not translate into additional real wage adjustments when 
the economy is contracting, while lower levels of unemployment during expansions have 
incremental effects on wage elasticity. This general result holds after accounting for 
differences in tenure, type of contract and age. Nevertheless, wages of newly hired workers 
are the most sensitive to the business cycle and exhibit the lowest asymmetric pattern 
between expansions and recessions. At the other end of the scale, wages of workers with 
more than six years’ tenure provide the most protection against economic downturns. The 
same is true for fixed-term vs. permanent workers and for young vs. older workers. 
Keywords: wage cyclicality, downward wage rigidity, social security data. 





En este trabajo se estima la sensibilidad cíclica de los salarios en España entre 1987 y 2013 a 
partir de los datos proporcionados por la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL). La 
ciclicidad de los salarios en el mercado de trabajo español es reducida, encontrándose, 
además, que esta ciclicidad es aún más baja en las épocas de recesión. Por otro lado, no se 
encuentra que niveles más elevados de desempleo provoquen un mayor descenso salarial en 
los períodos de recesión, mientras que una menor tasa de paro tiende a incrementar los 
aumentos salariales en épocas expansivas. Estos resultados a nivel agregado se mantienen 
cuando se analizan las posibles diferencias en la ciclicidad de los salarios en función de la 
antigüedad en el empleo, el tipo de contrato y la edad de los trabajadores. No obstante, los 
salarios de los entrantes al mercado, con menos de un año en el empleo, muestran la mayor 
sensibilidad a las condiciones cíclicas de la economía y el menor grado de asimetría entre las 
expansiones y las recesiones. Por el contrario, los salarios de los trabajadores con más de seis 
años de antigüedad en el empleo se caracterizan como los más protegidos frente a los ajustes 
salariales en las recesiones. Los resultados son similares cuando se analizan las diferencias 
entre trabajadores con contrato indefinido y aquellos con un contrato temporal y entre 
trabajadores jóvenes y trabajadores mayores. 
Palabras clave: ciclicidad salarial, rigideces salariales a la baja, registros administrativos de 
Seguridad Social. 
Códigos JEL: E32, J31. 
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1 Introduction 
Wage reaction to the crisis initiated in 2008 is in the core of the economic and political 
debate. This is especially so in Euro Area countries like Spain, where unemployment has 
more than tripled since 2008 while wages, at least in the initial phase of the crisis, failed to 
react to the strong deterioration of the labor market and a rise in real wages was observed1
However, the empirical literature on wage responsiveness to the economic cycle 
tends to be inconclusive. Studies based on aggregate data tend to fail in finding a pro-cyclical 
pattern in real wages for most countries, since changes in the composition of the work force 
induce a countercyclical bias in the aggregate real wage (Mitchell et al. (1985), Solon et al. 
(1994), for instance). On the other hand, studies based on micro data show a much clearer 
procyclical behavior of real wages (Shin (1994) and Devereux (2001), for instance). In addition, 
when worker’s heterogeneity is introduced, the procyclical pattern that wages exhibit tends to 
be more pronounced for newly-hired employees, while wages of incumbent workers are 
found to be more rigid (Carneiro et al. 2012, for instance). In the case of Spain, mostly due to 
the absence of individual databases to properly estimate wage elasticity to labor market 
conditions, the empirical evidence is scarce. A recent exception is De la Roca (2014), who 
uses Social Security Registers information to estimate wage elasticity to unemployment 
variation controlling for individual heterogeneity. In his study, De la Roca finds weak 
procyclicality of real wages in Spain, estimating that a one percentage point decline in the 
unemployment rate increases real wages by 0.4%. This estimate is considerably lower than 
the ones estimated for developed countries. In Pissarides (2009), for instance, elasticities are 
shown to be higher than 1 in most studies covering US and some European labor markets. 
. 
In this paper, we follow a similar approach to De la Roca (2014), although we focus 
on how wage cyclicality varies during the different phases of the business cycle. Theoretically, 
there are multiple reasons to expect an asymmetric response of wages to the prevailing 
economic conditions, being downward adjustments much more difficult in the presence of 
nominal and/or real downward wage rigidities, which are extensively documented in the 
literature (Dickens et al. (2010)). However, empirical evidence of differences along the 
business cycle is neither abundant nor conclusive. For instance, Cervini Pla et al (2013), using 
BHPS data for UK find that wage cyclicality is considerably higher in economic recessions 
and Martins (1997) finds similar results for Portugal. On the contrary, Shin and Shin (2008) for 
the US finds the opposite result, that is, wage cyclicality is higher during expansionary 
periods. As far as we are aware, we present the first empirical results regarding the Spanish 
labor market in this respect. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief 
description of the dataset. Section 3 discusses the methodology implemented. Section 4 
presents our estimated results. Final remarks are then presented in Section 5.  
 
                                                                            
1. It should be noticed that the rise in real wages is observed in 2008-2009 even when composition effects in 
employment are controlled. See Galan and Puente (2014).  
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2 Dataset  
In this study we make use of Spain’s Social Security Administrative Labor Records 
(Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL hereinafter), which records the 
employment histories of a 4% non-stratified random sample of workers registered in the 
social security system at some point between 2005 and 2013. For these workers, the 
MCVL records all labor market transitions and job characteristics since 1980 or since first 
appearance in the social security system. The high frequency of our data2 allows us to 
properly track labor market transitions, many of which would go unnoticed in lower 
frequency datasets. Altogether with the reliability of the information provided3
To estimate wage cyclicality we focus on the evolution of wages of salaried 
workers in the private sector, and exclude therefore self-employment and public 
administration employees. Our wage variable records daily real wages in 2011 prices
, the MCVL 
is a desirable longitudinal dataset to study wage responses to the cycle from a 
microeconomic point of view. 
4 for 
those workers that reported at least seven days5 of fulltime work in a given month. In this 
dataset wages are proxied by the Social Security contribution base. For most workers, this 
is exactly equal to the earned wage. However, the existence of an upper bound in the 
Social Security contribution base makes it impossible to know the exact wage for the top 
part of the distribution. Hence, salaries are right-censored for some individuals. We present 
estimates of the cyclicality excluding right-censored wages, but our results are not affected 
if we include them in the dataset6
To account for differences of wage response among different job tenure 
categories, we construct a variable that reflects worker’s tenure by accumulating the days 
worked in a firm. A worker starts a new job from either unemployment or inactivity, or from 
an employment to employment transition (switches firms). The former is classified as 
newly-hired, and the latter as a job mover. A worker will either be recorded as newly-hired 
or as a job mover within the first year in the firm. After that first year, our job tenure 
categories comprise 1-2 years of work in the firm, 2-4 years, 4-6 years, and 6 or more 
years
.  
7. Given the high frequency of our data it is possible to observe multiple transitions 
from employment to unemployment in a given calendar year by a single worker within the 
same firm. In this case, we will maintain the worker’s accumulated experience as long as 
the worker’s separation from the firm does not expand beyond 11 months8
                                                                            
2. We have monthly information on wages and information on any change in the activity status of the worker, as the 
dataset collects information on the initial and expiry date of every contractual relationship of the worker included in 
the sample.  
 and as long as 
the worker does not switch firms before returning. If the worker either switches firms or 
returns after 12 months or later, her accumulated working experience in the firm resets to 
zero. Table A in the Appendix presents main characteristics of our database, including 
3. Wage information coming from registers tends to be found more reliable than the one obtained from household 
surveys due to large measurement errors and underreporting of wages in these later datasets. 
4. Using general CPI as deflator. 
5. Results are almost identical if we require 21 working days in the month. 
6. Around 12% of workers are found to be paid at the maximum level of the contributory base in our database. 
7. Results are robust to different tenure grouping. 
8. Results are almost identical if we reduce this threshold to 4 months. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1504 
more than 12 million observations on a monthly basis from 19879
 
 to 2013 for some 
163,000 workers. As it can be seen in this Table, the composition of the workforce across 
tenure categories shows around one quarter of workers in the group of higher tenure (more 
than 6 years) while around 30% of workers are either newly-hired or job movers. 
                                                                            
9. Although workers’ registers start from 1980, our sample begins in 1987 due to the construction of the group with 
more tan six years of tenure.  
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3 Methodology 
The empirical model we use to analyze real wage cyclicality is a monthly level wage equation 
with individual fixed effects. The introduction of workers fixed effect is needed to address the 
workforce composition bias that originates along the different phases of the business cycle 
(Solon et al. 1994). Most commonly, previous studies have estimated a first differences wage 
regression model to address such composition bias (Solon et al. 1994, Shin 1994, Devereux 
2001). However, since we also want to estimate the wage cyclicality for those workers 
moving from non-employment to employment, we make use of a wage equation in levels10




Our model’s baseline specification is 
               (1) 
Where imω  is the real daily earnings of individual i  in month m , imX is a vector of 
time-varying individual and job type characteristics that include the age, the square of the 
age, the worker’s job tenure category, the type of contract, a proxy for education (the 
worker’s social security contribution group), and sector occupation dummies. In addition, a 
linear time trend m  and its square are included. 4−tU  is our cycle variable: The level of the 
aggregated unemployment rate experienced by the economy in quarter 𝑡 − 4 11 ime. Finally, is 
a zero mean random term with constant variance.  
Since all workers in month m  are exposed to the same level of unemployment, the 
standard error of the coefficient of interest 0ζ  would be underestimated in the presence of 
time-specific errors (Moulton 1986). As in De la Roca (2014), we follow Solon et al. (1994) and 
Devereux (2001), adopting a two-step estimation procedure to overcome this problem. Our 
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Equation 2 incorporates a set of dummy variables tD  that reflect year-quarter 
combinations12 tκ

. The estimated coefficients  capture variations in wages that are free from 
observed characteristics and time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. These 
coefficients are then regressed against the unemployment rate, a linear time trend and its 
                                                                            
10. This approach also allows us to keep those individuals that do not work in two consecutive periods. A very similar 
specification is used in De la Roca (2014) and Carneiro et al (2014), although in the latter case the richness of their 
database allows to include worker, job title and firm fixed effects. 
11. Lagged unemployment rate is normally used in the literature to take into account that wages are usually not able to 
respond contemporaneously to cyclical variations: since wage negotiations last for some time. Results are robust to 
different unemployment rate lags. 
12. There are a total of a 108 periods, from 1987:1 to 2013:4. Due to the number of coefficients that need to be 
estimated and the huge weight of the database, results are based on a 20% random sample of the MCVL. Results are 
not sensitive to this threshold, though. 
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square, and seasonal dummies (equation 3). The standard error of the elasticity of real wages 
to the unemployment rate µ , is now free from the grouped or aggregated bias present in 
equation (1). As our cyclical variable is the level of the unemployment rate, a negative estimate 
value of µ would imply that real wages are procyclical, while counter-cyclicality of wages 
would be indicated by a positive value. 
Insofar we are interested in tracking down asymmetries along the business cycle, we 
divide periods in which the economy is in expansion (measured by positive employment 
growth on a year-on year basis) from those periods that the economy is contracting (negative 
employment variation)13
In other words, we divide the business cycle in four phases. The first one consists of 
an economy in recession (employment is falling) and with a high level of unemployment 
(above the historical average), in the second phase the employment starts to rise but the 
economy still experiences high levels of unemployment. The third phase would consist of an 
expanding economy that enjoys low levels of unemployment and finally, in the fourth phase, 
the economy enters in recession but still maintains a low unemployment rate.  
. Moreover, we further divide periods according to the unemployment 
rate level being above or below the mean of the whole period considered (1987-2013). This 
distinction allows us to check, for instance, whether downward pressure on wages when 
employment is falling is more intense after a long recession -when unemployment is also 
high- or not. In principle, there are different reasons to think this would be the case if, for 
example, a long recession has left the economy with a large stock of unemployed workers 
posing extra pressure on wage adjustment. However, the opposite could be trueif, for 
example, the composition of the unemployment rate is biased towards a high percentage of 
long-term unemployed (possibly less attached to the labor market), resulting in alower 
downward pressure on wages. 
In Chart 1, we present the actual evolution of employment growth and 
unemployment rate in Spain since 1987. The vertical axis is plotted at the average 
unemployment rate across all the period (16.7%). Hence, the four sub-periods defined above 
correspond to the four quarters in the graph. The natural movement in such a graph is in 
counterclockwise circles, and a complete circle represents a complete business cycle.  
The chart represents two complete business cycles. Commenting only the most 
recent, high unemployment levels coexisted with incipient positive employment growth rates 
at the end of 1994. This situation lasted until the beginning of the 2000s (phase 2 in the 
above definitions, corresponding to the top-right quarter in the graph). Then, unemployment 
started to lie below its average (phase 3, top-left quarter). This expansionary period lasted 
until the end of 2007, with a decreasing unemployment rate below the historical average. 
Recession initiated in 2008 with a marked decrease in employment, although unemployment 
rate was still below the average until the beginning of 2010 (phase 4, bottom-left quarter). 
Finally, the continuing deterioration in the labor market brought unemployment rate above its 
average until the end of the sample period (phase 1, bottom-right quarter). 
 
                                                                            
13. Results are robust to use year-on-year variations of the unemployment rate. 
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4 Empirical results  
Before presenting our estimated results of real wage cyclicality it is worth presenting some of 
the main characterizing features of the wage setting in Spain over the period 1987 to 2013. 
Firstly, collective agreements cover about 90% of the salaried workforce in the private sector 
despite relatively low unionization levels, due the automatic extensions of collective 
agreements. Collective agreements are mainly bargained at the province-sector level, with a 
very low share of firm-level agreements. This predominance of negotiations at an intermediate 
level of decentralization has been found to provide a low association of wages and labor 
conditions to firms’ individual performance (See, for instance, Bentolila et al (2010) and 
Izquierdo et al (2004). Recent labor market reforms have indeed tried to increase de 
decentralization of the collective bargaining system in Spain, although it is still not possible to 
assess the impact of these reforms on wage cyclicality. Moreover, traditionally, the Spanish 
labor market has been characterized by a strong wage indexation to inflation, resulting in a 
high inertia of wages and real downward wage rigidities (Messina et al, 2007). 
Table 1 depicts the estimates of our two-step equation model, showing real wage 
semi-elasticity to unemployment variations along the four business cycle phases defined 
previously.14 The first thing to notice is that, regardless of what phase the economy is in, 
real wages are very weakly procyclical in Spain. Our estimates point-out to an increase 
(decrease) of between 0.24-0.48 pp in real wages after a decrease (increase) of 1pp in the 
unemployment rate. These estimates are similar to those reported by De la Roca (2014) for 
the Spanish case when no differences across the business cycle phases are allowed, and 
much lower than those found for other countries. For instance, Pissarides (2009) 
summarizes the evidence of real wage cyclicality in the US and some European countries 
finding wage to unemployment semi-elasticities being above 1 in the US case, although 
with large differences between job-movers and job-stayers. Results for different European 
countries also tend to find this elasticity above 1, especially in the UK (close to 2 according 
to Deveraux and Hart (2006) and Peng and Siebert (2007), but also in Germany, Italy or 
Portugal.15
On top of this low wage sensitivity to business cycle conditions, we also find 
significant differences depending on the cyclical phase of the economy. That is, wage 
cyclicality in Spain does not exhibit a symmetric pattern along the business cycle, and wages 
respond differently depending on what phase of the cycle the economy is operating in. 
 
In particular, looking at the results shown in Table 1, downward wage rigidities seem 
to be playing a relevant role in the Spanish labor market, as wage cyclicality is much lower in 
recessions than in expansions, and the level of the unemployment rate appears to be relevant 
only in expansionary periods. These results are in line to those reported by Shin and Shin 
(2008) for the US, although in that case no distinction was made according to the level of the 
unemployment rate. 
                                                                            
14. Using regional data in the definition of the cyclical phases is very demanding computationally, because it multiplies 
the dimensionality of the first step of the estimation. In any case, we carried-out a test with reducing the sample to one 
quarter and results were very similar.. 
15. See references in Table III in Pissarides (2009). 
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More specifically, if we analyze how wage cyclicality varies along the four phases 
defined in this paper, Column 2 would describe how wages are related to unemployment 
variations in a recovery phase, like the situation in Spain in 2014, where employment is 
starting to grow, but unemployment rate is still above the historical average. In this situation, 
wages increase as a response to reductions in the unemployment rate, with a semi-elasticity 
of 0.38%. If this situation persists, and the expansionary period leads to unemployment falling 
below its average, the economy would enter in the phase defined by Column 3. In this new 
phase, higher upward pressure on wages derived from the lower unemployment rate and an 
increasing level of employment, wage semi-elasticity to unemployment rises to 0.48%. This 
higher wage sensitivity to the unemployment rate is found to be significantly higher than the 
one observed under higher unemployment at the 1% confidence level. 
Nevertheless, once the expansionary period ends and the economy starts shrinking, 
a significantly lower wage reaction to unemployment is found. In particular, a one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate decreases real wages by 0.25% (column 4). Thus, 
wage response is almost half that the one observed in the previous expansionary period, 
being this difference statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, these results would be 
coherent with the existence of significant downward wage rigidities in Spain, since wage 
cyclicality is much lower in recessions than in expansions. Eventually, as the economy 
continues deteriorating and the unemployment rate keeps rising, the economy moves into a 
period that combines a worsening economy and a high level of unemployment. Nonetheless, 
as we can see in Column (1), the elasticity of wages does not experience any variation 
(remains at –0.25%), and the increasing level of unemployment fails to induce any additional 
pressure on wages adjustment.  
In other words, the elasticity of wages to unemployment when the economy is in 
recession is low and it is not found to be dependent of the unemployment level. When the 
economy moves out of the recession, real wages are found to show a greater link to business 
cycle conditions, although lower than in other countries. In these expansionary periods, a low 
level of unemployment rate is associated with additional wage pressures, while this is not the 
case in recessionary periods. Overall, these results indicate the existence of significant 
asymmetries in wage formation in Spain, possibly reflecting the impact of the prevailing labor 
market institutions, such as the interaction between the very high duality between permanent 
and temporary workers, and the prevalence of sectoral levels of negotiations: Overall, this 
collective bargaining system could be characterized as providing a high level of protection to 
working conditions of the incumbents or insiders in the labor market, while concerns over the 
access to a job for those in unemployment are set aside in the bargaining process. As a 
result, both high levels of unemployment and wage growth can coexist during the first stages 
of economic recovery, therefore delaying the necessary reduction in unemployment. 
In order to fully understand these differences in wage cyclicality across the business 
cycle and trying to interpret the low wage elasticity observed in Spain with respect to other 
countries, we next break down differences in wage response to the business cycle for 
different firm-specific tenure categories. To this end we interact our six tenure categories with 
the year-quarter pair dummies in the first stage regression (equation 2 in previous section), 
and estimate six separate regression models in the second step (equation 3). Estimated 
results are reported in Table 2. 
In this Table, we observe that differences across the four cyclical phases defined in 
this paper are similar across the six tenure categories used. That is, real wages elasticity to 
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unemployment is higher when the economy is expanding and presents low levels of 
unemployment, regardless of the accumulated experience a worker has within a firm. Similarly 
and during recessions, real wage exhibits a lower elasticity to the unemployment rate 
evolution, and this downward real wage rigidity seems to be unaffected by the level of 
unemployment. Again, once the economy initiates its recovery, real wages start increasing 
again for all tenure categories with a higher sensitivity to our cycle indicator than they showed 
during recessions. In any case, it should be noted that, as in other countries (Pissarides, 
2009, Carneiro et al., 2012), wage cyclicality is found to be higher for newly-hired workers, 
with point estimates for wage semi-elasticity ranging from -0.41 (in recessions) to -0.65 in 
expansionary periods with low unemployment. By contrast, long-tenure workers are found to 
show very weak wage cyclicality, from -0.13 in recessions to a maximum of -0.33 in 
expansionary periods. Wage cyclicality estimates are, on a general basis, found to show a 
monotonic inverse relationship with tenure in the Spanish labor market. 
In table 2.A we present the significance of these differences across tenure categories 
and to what extent there is some variation across the business cycle. In this regard, 
differences in wage cyclicality between new-hired, job movers, and low tenure (less than 2 
years) workers tend to be non significant, while long-tenure workers tend to exhibit a 
significantly lower wage sensitivity to unemployment. Interestingly, downward wage rigidities 
seem to be playing a relevant role protecting wage falls for workers with a tenure higher than 
two years in the most adverse cyclical situation (recessions with high unemployment) while, 
by contrast, in expansionary periods only long tenure workers (more than 6 years) show a 
significantly lower wage reaction to unemployment. 
Another interesting dimension, although closely related to tenure, is to look at 
differences in wage cyclicality in Spain by type of contract. The Spanish labor market is 
characterized by a high level of duality, where a large proportion of the salaried workforce 
(about 24% in 2014, but above 30% over the expansionary period) is under fixed-term 
contracts with a high turnover rate, while the rest holds over in permanent contracts with high 
redundancy costs.  
Table 3 reflects that wages of workers under fixed-term contracts are more sensitive 
to the unemployment rate than those wages of workers subject to permanent contracts. In 
fact, in column (1) we observe that wages of workers under fixed-term contracts are almost 
two times more responsive to job destruction when the economy is in recession and 
unemployment is high than wages of workers with a permanent contract (-0.43 vs -0.21). 
Once the economy starts recovering, and despite the existence of a high level of unemployed 
stock, real wages become more sensitive than they were during the recession for both 
contract type workers (Column 2), although the increase in the sensitivity is found to be higher 
for permanent workers. Thus, the wage elasticity in this phase of the cycle is also higher for 
workers with temporary jobs, but the asymmetry of the real wage response is higher for 
workers with a permanent job. Once the unemployment rate has lowered and the economy 
continues expanding (column 3), real wages of permanent workers become even more 
sensitive to unemployment reductions, while the increase in wage sensitivity of workers with 
fixed-term contract is lower. In the next phase (column 4), when the economy enters in 
recession but still enjoys a low level of unemployed workers, real wages decrease in a less 
sensitive way for both groups, but more markedly for those with a permanent contract. 
Overall, as it can be seen in Table 3.A, semi-elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate is 
statistically higher for those with a temporary contract than for permanent workers, being the 
exception expansionary periods with low unemployment, when traditionally highly rigid wages 
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of permanent workers show a wage sensitivity to cyclical conditions similar to the one 
estimated for temporary workers. In other words, asymmetries in wage adjustment between 
expansions and recessions are clearly higher in Spain among permanent workers, who are 
especially protected from wage cuts in recessions.  
Finally, Table 4 depicts wage semi-elasticity by age groups. We observe that wages 
of older workers are the most protected from the business cycle in all four phases, while 
wages of workers aged 16 to 29 years old are the most affected by changes in the 
unemployment rate. For all age group categories, we observe that wages are more sensitive 
to expansions than they are to recessions. Furthermore, a higher unemployment rate does 
not statistically affect the path at which real wages adjust during a recession, while the 
opposite is true with a lower unemployment rate when the economy is expanding. This is in 
fact, a clear example of downwardly rigid wages. 
All in all, the estimations for different groups suggests a lower wage elasticity 
(especially in recessions) for those groups more protected from unemployment (permanent, 
older, and high tenured). 
4.1  Can we identify any difference in the Great Recession? 
A tentative question to answer is whether wage responsiveness to the economic conditions 
has differed between the early 90s crisis and the Great Recession that tripled the 
unemployment rate in the Spanish labour market between 2008 and 2013. Moreover, 
different labor market reforms have been adopted in the more recent period, wich, in 
principle, could have had an impact on wage responsiveness to labour market conditions. 
In particular, 2012 labor market reform16
To perform our analysis of differences between the “old” recession and the “new” 
recession, we divide the whole period in 5 periods: the old recession (1991q4 to 1994q3), the 
first phase of the recent recession (2008q3 to 2012q2, lasting 7 quarters as the 90’s 
recession), the second phase of the recent crisis after the 2012 reform (2012q3 to 2013q4), 
and our two expansionary periods with low and high levels of unemployment.  
 introduced different measures to increase the 
possibility for firms to adjust wages in the presence of adverse shocks, as the easing of 
opt-out clauses and the prevalence of firm-level agreements over higher-level collective 
agreements. To answer this question, we first take into account that no significant 
differences were found between high and low unemployment periods in recessions so we 
just define one type of recession periods with independence of the level of unemployment. 
Estimates are reported in table 5, showing very similar results to the ones commented in 
the previous sections. In recessions, wage elasticity to unemployment is lower (in absolute 
value) than in expansions, while wage response in expansions is significantly higher when 
unemployment is low.  
Estimated results (see table 6) show some differences between the three 
recessionary periods defined in this exercise, although they tend to be non-significant. In 
particular, in the 90’s crisis, wage elasticity is estimated at -.24, very close to the estimate for 
the second phase of the current crisis (-.26), while a lower wage sensitivity to unemployment 
is estimated in the first phase of the crisis (-.14). This is in line with previous results showing 
the increase in real wages in the first phase of the recent crisis (Galán and Puente, 2014) 
although no statistical difference is found with the early 90’s crisis. However, if we focus in 
                                                                            
16. Different measures were also adopted in 2010 and 2011 regarding collective bargaining with potential impact on 
wage determination. 
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comparing the wage responsiveness between the two phases of the recent crisis, results 
reported in Table 6 show a significantly higher wage elasticity to unemployment in the second 
phase of the crisis. This result would be in line with preliminary assessments of the different 
measures introduced in the 2012 labour market reform17 that indicated some increase in the 
possibilities for Spanish firms to adjust wages to the situation of the labour market. In any 
case, in order to properly interpret this result some caveats should be considered. First, this 
higher estimated elasticity of wages at the end of our sample period could also be reflecting 
the effect of a longer and more persistent crisis with no precedents in our sample period. 
Also, it should be noticed that this higher wage elasticity found is not higher than the historical 
standards observed in the Spanish economy in previous recessions18
 
, it keeps the 
asymmetric pattern observed in the past being lower than the one estimated in expansions 
and, finally, it remains well below the estimates available for other countries.  
                                                                            
17. OECD (2013) and Izquierdo et al (2013) 
18. At least the only one in our sample period, between 1991 and 1994. 
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5 Final Remarks 
In this paper, we have carried out an analysis of the wage cyclicality in Spain accounting for 
worker heterogeneity. Our results show that real wages are very weakly procyclical, showing a 
much lower association with the cyclical conditions in the labor market than the observed in 
other European countries. Moreover, wage sensitiveness to unemployment is not constant 
along the business cycle. In fact, real wages are found to be more sensitive to unemployment 
decreases during expansionary periods, while downward wage rigidities pose limits to wage 
adjustments in recessions. Furthermore, the level of unemployed stock in the economy seems 
not to affect the path at which real wages adjust during an economic downturn, but low levels of 
unemployed individuals lead to higher procyclicality of real wages in a booming economy. 
This general picture remains unchanged when we look at differences between 
different types of workers, in particular, across tenure categories, contract type, and age 
groups. We show that wages procyclicality is lower for high tenured individuals, those with a 
permanent contract, and older workers, who also present a higher asymmetry in wage 
cyclicality between expansions and recessions. As a result, these workers are especially 
protected against wage adjustments in economic downturns, while during expansionary 
periods these differences tend to disappear. 
All in all, these results point out to very low wage cyclicality in Spain with respect to 
the one usually estimated for the US and other European countries, where downward wage 
rigidities play a relevant role in limiting wage reductions in recessions. These results are fully in 
line with recent developments in the Spanish labour market where wage reaction to the 
strong increase in unemployment rate was mild, especially in the first phase of the crisis. 
Moreover, it should be noticed that composition effects exacerbate the weak procyclicality of 
wages in Spain in recessions, since those groups with lower wage sensitiveness to the cycle, 
permanent workers and those with longer tenure, increase their share in total employment in 
downturns19
Although identifying the sources of these rigidities is beyond the scope of this paper, 
these results would be in line with previous analysis, which have documented the presence of 
rigidities in the adjustment of labor costs in Spain with a high degree of price indexation (see, 
for instance Druant et al 2008 for a comparative analysis with other European countries). The 
Spanish labor market (see for instance Estrada et al 2009) is characterized by a high degree 
of wage stickiness, mostly deriving by the main features of the collective bargaining system, 
where automatic extension of agreements extend their application to all firms and workers 
(Bentolila et al 2010). In this respect, recent reforms approved as a reaction to the strong 
deterioration of the labor market, tried to increase wage bargaining decentralization, 
increasing firm’s possibilities to adjust wages in the presence of adverse shocks. In principle, 
our results would indicate that these measures may have been able to correct the excessive 
wage rigidity observed in the first phase of the crisis but they would not have increased wage 
responsiveness above the one observed in previous recessions. 
. 
  
                                                                            
19. See Table A in the Appendix. 
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Overall -0.243*** *** -0.383*** *** -0.481*** *** -0.245*** no
(0.038) (0.041) (0.067) (0.065)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level





















New hires -0.416*** *** -0.548*** ** -0.649*** *** -0.408*** no
(0.045) (0.048) (0.079) (0.077)
Job movers -0.333*** *** -0.484*** no -0.533*** *** -0.315*** no
(0.044) (0.047) (0.076) (0.075)
Tenure 1-2 -0.350*** *** -0.486*** ** -0.584*** *** -0.282*** no
(0.047) (0.051) (0.083) (0.081)
Tenure 2-4 -0.274*** *** -0.456*** *** -0.599*** *** -0.267** no
(0.047) (0.051) (0.083) (0.082)
Tenure 4-6 -0.237*** *** -0.381*** *** -0.533*** *** -0.298*** no
(0.040) (0.043) (0.070) (0.068)
Tenure 6+ -0.130*** *** -0.253*** *** -0.333*** *** -0.134*  no
(0.033) (0.036) (0.058) (0.057)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level









Job movers no no no no
Tenure 1-2 no no no no
Tenure 2-4 ** no no no
Tenure 4-6 *** ** no no
Tenure 6+ *** *** *** **
(a) Tests against New Hires
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level






























Permanent -0.207*** *** -0.345*** *** -0.466*** *** -0.209** no
(0.041) (0.044) (0.071) (0.070)
Fixed-term -0.431*** *** -0.520*** * -0.587*** *** -0.414*** no
(0.043) (0.046) (0.074) (0.072)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level









Fixed-term *** *** no **
(a) Test against Permanent contract
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level





















16-29 -0.306*** *** -0.497*** *** -0.611*** *** -0.318*** no
(0.046) (0.049) (0.080) (0.079)
30-45 -0.227*** *** -0.364*** *** -0.469*** *** -0.224*** no
(0.037) (0.040) (0.065) (0.063)
45+ -0.146*** *** -0.264*** *** -0.353*** *** -0.146*  no
(0.035) (0.037) (0.061) (0.060)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level









30-45 no ** no no
45+ *** *** *** *
(a) Test against 16-29 group
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level

























Overall -0.243*** *** -0.382*** *** -0.480*** ***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.056)
*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
* Significant at the 10 percent level














Overall -0.239*** -0.135** -0.260*** -0.367*** -0.435***




*** Significant at the 1 percent level
** Significant at the 5 percent level
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Chart 1: Employment Growth vs. Unemployment Rate in Spain:  Counterclockwise rotation
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 














New hires 17.7 13.7 20.4 18.8 15.4
Job movers 13.1 8.2 11.4 16.3 11.0
Tenure 1-2 14.3 11.6 13.9 15.4 15.4
Tenure 2-4 17.6 18.2 15.5 17.7 19.8
Tenure 4-6 10.9 13.8 9.9 10.1 11.0
Tenure 6+ 26.4 34.4 28.9 21.7 27.5
Permanent 68.9 78.6 70.6 62.9 74.2
Fixed-term 31.1 21.4 29.4 37.1 25.8
16-29 27.6 18.2 32.3 30.6 24.3
30-45 46.8 51.1 44.7 45.3 49.0








163,447 99,295 76,317 138,472 94,739
(a) Calculated from a 20% random sample of the MCVL
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